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WHO SPEAKS FOR THE CHILD: THE PROBLEMS OF PROXY CONSENT.

Edited by Willard Gay/in and Ruth Macklin. New York: Plenum
Press. 1982. Pp. xii, 315. $25.
Commentators often analyze social problems in terms of what should be
decided rather than who should decide. But in Who Speaks for the Child:
The Problems of Proxy Consent, editors Gaylin and Macklin address the
question of who shall choose on behalf of a legally incompetent child. As
Gaylin observes, this question of proxy consent 1 poses "one of a half dozen
most crucial moral problems emerging from the biological revolution" (p.
4). The book includes nine essays that examine the proxy consent issue in
the context of medical intervention. The result is a good introduction to the
problem, but one too general and uninventive to aid the legal scholar looking for fresh approaches in a developing area of the law. The essays emphasize two central themes. The first involves the competence of the child
as a self-decider, while the second concerns the question of who may choose
on behalf of a child legally incapable of deciding for itself. In developing
these ideas, the essays deal in passing with the consequences of some medical choices, not so much to determine the rightness or wrongness of any
alternative, but to establish an inference regarding who should decide in a
given situation.
The first two chapters, written by editor Willard Gaylin, develop a principle of "variable competence."2 Gaylin begins by discussing several accepted limits on competence, and in this regard merely attaches new labels
to old ideas.3 He then offers his most interesting contribution, a paradigm
for his principle of "variable competence." He argues that the ratio of individual risk to individual gain in a given medical procedure should influence
the propriety of state restrictions on the child's capacity to consent (pp. 4043). For example, if a choice poses a high risk and a low gain, the child's
right to take the risk should be limited while its right to refuse should be
maximized (p. 43). Although thought provoking, this portion of the book
hinges on a fairly simple cost-benefit approach to determine how much autonomy a child ought to have in a particular situation. Consequently, although Gaylin's discussion provides a framework for further analysis, it
1. Gaylin describes "proxy consent" as a "confusing and inadequate heading" but states
that the issue revolves around "an interrelated set of questions about authority and autonomy:
the rights of the individual, or the family, versus the power of the state; the nature of decision
making and the values of society . . . ." P. 4. As Gerald Dworkin points out in chapter six,
the term "proxy consent" is misleading. The incompetent on whose behalf a given choice is
made does not delegate his decision-making authority to a proxy, nor is he in a position to
consent in his own right. Pp. 196-97. Although the book never expressly defines proxy consent, the term evidently applies to those situations in which a person is called upon to decide
for another who lacks the legal competence to choose for himself.
2. Gaylin contends that arbitrary statutory definitions of competence should not determine
a minor's capacity to consent to medical treatment, and urges instead that legal competence
should vary according to the minor's maturity and the nature of the decision. Pp. 27-29.
3. Gaylin divides competence limiting conditions into six categories: limits of consciousness, intelligence, rationality, perception, experience and age. P. 32.
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offers nothing in the way of earth-shattering legal or philosophical
exposition.
The second part of Who Speaks for the Child departs from theory and
addresses substantive legal issues. The first selection in this section, written
by Alexander Morgan Capron, deals with the child's capacity to consent to
medical intervention. The article surveys the law concerning competence of
children by examining the emancipation of minors, the emergency rule,
specialized consent, and the mature-minor rule. Capron argues that even
though the law generally presumes that minors are incompetent to make
their own medical decisions, the legal trend favors granting a child who is
intellectually able to give informed consent the legal right to do so (p. 89).
Though this chapter advocates expanded legal capacity for minors, the
author structures it more as a survey of the law than as a normative evaluation of legal principles. Thus, the value of this portion of the book lies not
in its development of a new measure of capacity, but in its general analysis
of the legal considerations that affect competence. 1J! this connection, the
chapter comes complete with an Appendix that summarizes in chart form
the various state statutes that bear on the minor's competency to consent. 4
The most provocative portion of Who Speaks for the Child appears in
chapters four and five, both of which deal with the question of who shall
decide on behalf of a child who lacks the legal capacity to choose for itself.
The first piece, written by Professor Capron, begins with the assumption
that at least some people lack the capacity to decide for themselves about
biomedical intervention (p. 117). The author then points out that courts
often decide questions concerning medical treatment for incompetents on
the basis of "the appropriateness of the choice not of the chooser" (p. 146).
He urges that the law should presume that parents act in their child's best
interests and that the state should intrude on family autonomy only ~f clear
and convincing proof shows that the parents cannot represent their child (p.
144). The approach is intriguing because it examines the moral implications of proxy consent in terms of who is best able to decide. But Capron's
commentary is fairly general, and the only suggestions he offers to courts
faced with the problem of proxy consent are that the decision-maker should
be vigorous, conscientious, and have no conflict of interest with the incompetent (p. 150). These conclusions, while defensible, do not provide courts
with new ways to resolve the proxy consent issue. At best, Capron's discussion develops an intellectual framework from which an interested neophyte
can evaluate more detailed discussion of proxy consent.
A more sophisticated approach appears in the following chapter, written
by Joseph Goldstein.5 Professor Goldstein balances state intervention in
medical decisions against parental autonomy, and concludes that because
the law cannot supervise effectively the interaction between parent and
child, the only justifiable policy favors minimum state intervention (pp.
160-61). Goldstein argues for a paradigm in which the state can overcome
4. Although the chart is convenient, it is also limited because it does not identify commonlaw rules of consent, and because the drafters have excluded certain types of statutes from
consideration. Pp. 91-92.
5. This chapter also appears as Goldstein, Medical Care far the Child at Risk: On State
Supervention of Parental Autonomy, 86 YALE L.J. 645 (1977).

March 1983)

Who Speaks for the Child

1085

the presumption of parental autonomy only if it establishes (1) that the
medical profession agrees about what constitutes proper treatment for the
child; (2) that the expected outcome of the treatment is a chance for normal,
healthy growth or at least a life worth living; and (3) that the expected outcome of denial of treatment would be death for the child (p. 163). The
author contends that in the absence of any of these elements, the state
should not prevent parents from choosing on behalf of their child: "[p]ut
somewhat more starkly, how can parents in such situation give the wrong
answer since there is no way of knowing the right answer?" (p. 166).
Several chapters in Part II, labelled "The Values at Stake," support
Goldstein's analysis. For example, Margaret O'Brien Steinfel discusses
family autonomy. She surveys legal issues affecting children's rights, and
concludes that family autonomy is essential to avoid "abandoning children
to their rights" (p. 245). And editor Ruth Macklin's critique in chapter nine
places Goldstein's contribution in perspective. She disputes his conclusions
on the ground that "granting parents the procedural right and responsibility
to decide for their children does not automatically confer substantive rightness on anything they may decide" (p. 276). Regardless of how the reader
resolves the issue, Macklin's response to several of Goldstein's assumptions
effectively introduces the underlying moral implications of determining
who shall choose.6
At times, the book's discussion will not prove particularly valuable to
the lawyer. For example, the seventh chapter, by Peter Brown, discusses
"the principles that should govern a parental decision to grant or withhold
consent" (p. 209). Brown's analysis focuses on the idea that parents should
make decisions that secure for children what John Rawls described as "primary goods." 7 Although this discussion may prove useful to the philosopher, it lacks the practical grounding that characterizes most of the book.
The book's final chapter, written by editor Ruth Macklin, defends decisions made in the child's best interest. Macklin evaluates many of the key
arguments advanced by other contributors and concludes that the "best interest of the child . . . should prevail" (p. 301 ). Her discussion returns to
the substantive aspect of proxy consent, and provides yet another perspective on the procedural question of who should decide.
Several criticisms apply to Who Speaks far the Child as a whole. First,
the book provides only a general treatment of a complex subject. Although
the articles are well written and organized, the reader cannot escape the
impression that the book merely outlines the dimensions of a far greater
problem. Overlap among chapters enhances this sense of incompleteness.
Different contributors occasionally discuss the same case or issue in a similar fashion and the resulting duplication repeats analysis at the expense of
6. As Macklin acknowledges, however, Goldstein's views "are well documented and fully
elaborated" in J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD (1979). P. 288. Nevertheless, Goldstein's contribution to Who Speaksfor the Child is a
valuable if brief introduction to the central issues surrounding the proxy consent question. See
also J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
(1979).
7. P. 213. "The primary social goods, to give them in broad categories, are rights and
liberties, opportunities and powers, income and wealth." J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 92
(1971).
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depth. Second, the fact that the articles range from philosophical to legal in
their emphasis detracts from the thoroughness with which the contributors
explore any given dimension of the problem.
Who Speaks for the Child does possess at least two virtues. First, it is a
readable general introduction to the problem of proxy consent. Second, it
shifts the center of analysis from the substantive issue of what shall be decided on behalf of the child to a discussion of who shall decide. But at
some level, virtue becomes vice; because the book treats the subject of
proxy consent in a general way, it will not be useful to those already familiar with the problem. Although Who Speaksfor the Child makes interesting
reading, it does less to suggest directions toward a satisfying solution to the
challenge of proxy consent than it does to confirm the elusiveness of any
such truly compelling approach.

